In this paper I argue for interpreting quantified noun phrases in their surface position, contra the quantifier movement approach of Heim and Kratzer (1998) . I argue that noun phrases uniformly denote type 〈1〉 functions, which reduce arity of predicates they combine with by 1. I offer both empirical and conceptual arguments in favor of this approach.
Introduction
Heim & Kratzer (H&K 1998) , 1 which we address here, claim (p.178) that quantified DPs in object position, as in (1), constitute a "type mismatch".
(1)
John offended every linguist
Quantified DPs are assigned a semantic type ((e,t),t) in which they map properties, denotations of type (e,t), to truth values, denotations of type t. properties are functions from entities to truth values. Ss like (1) are problematic for them since the transitive verb offend has type (e,(e,t)), not the type for properties but rather that of functions from entities to properties. So on H&K's analysis neither offend nor every linguist is interpreted as a function whose domain contains the denotation of the other, so their interpretative mechanisms "are stuck" (H&K p.179) and cannot assign an interpretation to offend every linguist. H&K adopt a Fregean solution to the problem by changing the syntax of (1) so that offend every linguist is not a logical constituent. Rather the syntactic object which is compositionally interpreted is (2), in which the DP every linguist has been moved: (2) ((every linguist),(n,(John offended t n )))
The type mismatch problem disappears since every linguist, of type ((e,t),t), now combines with an expression (n,(John offended t n )) of type (e,t). It denotes the function more usually denoted by λx.john offended x, which maps an entity b to the truth value of John offended x when the variable x is set to denote b.
H&K contrast their movement solution with one in which every linguist is interpreted in situ. The option they present involves assigning multiple types to quantified DPs. Every linguist would have type ((e,t),t) when used as a subject, combining with an expression of type (e,t) to form one of type t, but it has type ((e,(e,t)),(e,t)) when used as an object. There it maps binary relations, such as that denoted by offend, to properties, such as that denoted by offend every linguist. H&K acknowledge that the two approaches are sufficiently different on a global level to resist easy comparison. And they allow that it is "conceivable" that the two approaches are simultaneously useful. Then they present three "standard" (p. 193) arguments in favor of movement, offering no comparable merits of in situ approaches.
In this Reply I offer a more natural in situ analysis not involving multiple types, drawn from Keenan (1992 Keenan ( , 1993 and Keenan & Westerståhl (1997) . I argue that it is the natural, or default, interpretation of DPs. An analogue of movement is used for a variety of "marked" cases. These claims are compatible with Hornstein's (1995) minimalist analysis in which movement is a "last resort requirement" (p.157).
Formal preliminaries
It will behoove us to be explicit about the basics of defining functions, so we repeat here some information that many readers know, if just implicitly. A function F from a set A to a set B is a way of associating with each α in A a unique element β in B, and we say that F maps α to β and write F(α) = β. A is the domain of the function F, noted Dom(F), and B its codomain, Cod(F). The set {F(α)| α ∈ A} of values of F is the range of F. We use map as a synonym for function. In general to define a function F you must say: (1) what Dom(F) is, (2) what Cod(F) is, and (3) for each α ∈ Dom(F), what F(α) is. We note the set of functions from A into B as [A→B] . (B A is more common, but hard to iterate). For V any set and α 1 ,...,α n n choices of elements from V, we write 〈α 1 ,...,α n 〉 for that sequence of length n, called an n-ary sequence, whose first coordinate is α 1 , whose second is α 2 ,..., and whose n th is α n 3 . e is the unique sequence of length 0. Now we define a simple function referred to in the sequel:
Let V be the two element set {a,b} and V* the set of finite sequences of elements of V. So V* = {e, 〈a〉, 〈b〉, 〈a,a〉, 〈a,b〉, ...}. We define a function h which maps each non-empty such sequence to the result of deleting its last coordinate. Formally, Dom(h) = V*−{e}, Cod(h) = V*, and for all n ≥ 0, h(〈α 1 ,...,α n+1 〉) = 〈α 1 ,...,α n 〉.
So h(〈a,a,a〉) = 〈a,a〉. Also h(〈a,a,b〉) = 〈a,a〉. Note that for each n ≥ 0, h has all sequences of length n+1 in its domain, mapping each to a sequence of length n. But there is no sense in which h is "ambiguous". We have well defined h in giving its domain, V*−{e}, its codomain, V*, and in stating its unique value at each argument in its domain.
Interpreting DPs
We consider first the model theoretic interpretation of the subject DPs in (4), where for notational uniformity we use 'Pn' for n-place predicate − they combine successively with n arguments to form a P0 or zero place predicate (Sentence, IP, ...).
(4) P0 DP all/most/some/no poets P1 daydream As in H&K, P0s are of type t and denote in the set {0,1} of truth values (0 = False, 1 = True) and P1s are of type (e,t), and so in a model with domain E, denote properties, functions from E into {0,1}. Nouns like poet are also property denoting. We write the noun in upper case for the set of elements of E the noun property maps to 1. So POET ⊆ E. Then, as in H&K, Def 1 gives correct denotations (in upper case) for the Dets in (4). They map the subsets A of E to functions mapping properties to truth values.
Def 1 For all subsets A of E and all properties p from E into {0,1},
So ALL(POET) is true of the DAYDREAM property iff each b ∈ POET is a b that DAYDREAM is true of. That is, each poet daydreams. SOME(POET) maps DAYDREAM to True iff the intersection of the set of poets with the set of objects that daydream is not empty. No poet daydreams is true iff that set is empty. And Most poets daydream is true iff the number of poets who daydream is greater than half the number of poets.
So we agree with H&K on the values that ALL(POET), etc. have at P1 denotations. But we differ from them in not claiming that the domain of those functions is just the set of properties. Rather we will treat these functions as mapping Pn+1 denotations, noted Pn+1, to Pn (Pn denotations), all n, just as our function h above took sequences of length n+1 as arguments yielding sequences of length n as values, all n. The difference is that our new functions map each set of n+1-ary sequences to a set of n-ary sequences. And the crucial idea here is that the value of one of these functions at any Pn+1 is uniquely determined by its values at the P1s. So once we have defined one of these functions on the P1s (e.g. ALL(A), MOST(A), etc.) we have uniquely determined its values at all Pn+1s. First let us formally define the sets Pn in which Pn's denote (E is arbitrary and held constant throughout).
Def 2 i. P0 = {0,1} and ii. for all n,
, both as in H&K. And now we take the domain of the functions F we are defining to be ∪ n≥0 Pn+1, the set of n+1-ary relations, all n. So all the unary relations, the maps from E into {0,1}, are in that set. And all the binary relations (maps from E into the unary relations) are in that set, etc. The codomain of these functions is ∪ n≥0 Pn. And for each each H ∈ Pn+1, F(H) is that element of Pn given by: 
The last line says that John admires all poets iff each poet is a member of the set of objects John admires. The value that ALL(POET) assigns to the P2 ADMIRE, line 1 above, is determined by the values it assigns to P1s, line 2.
Elements of Den E (DP), the set of possible denotations of DPs over a domain E, will be called functions of type 〈1〉. They reduce arity (adicity) by 1. The claim that DPs should be interpreted as type 〈1〉 functions will be called The Rich DP Hypothesis (or just Rich DP). It differs from H&K's Move DP in which DPs only take properties as arguments. On Rich DP they take elements of Pn+1 as arguments, all n. And we note without proof:
Theorem 1 For every F from P1 to P0 there is exactly one element of Den E (DP) which takes the same values at the elements of P1 as F does.
Thus we can define a type 〈1〉 function F by giving its values on the P1s and saying that F is that type 〈1〉 function with those values on the P1s. On this understanding we might continue to write the type of DPs as ((e,t),t), though we might prefer a more transparent notation, such as (p n+1 ,p n ). Note that no type 〈1〉 function is "ambiguous", but each has a large domain.
Some Linguistic Implications of the Rich DP Hypothesis
1. An immediate, and encouraging, consequence of Rich DP is that we have at least a partial account for why English speakers utter DPs in object position. Move DP is, on reflection, quite discouraging. It says that to interpret transitive Ss like John admires all poets we must change the structure English provides so that all poets occurs outside the scope of admires.
But why then does English use these structures? Why don't we speak in LFs of the sort H&K provide? Rich DP, on which we interpret just the constituents of John admires all poets, provides an answer to this question, Move DP does not.
Note that we are not impugning Frege's achievement. He found, and found first, a solution to the problem of "multiple quantification"− it can be understood as iterated unary quantification. But Frege's problem was to provide a foundation for mathematics. Ours is to model natural language. We might state our problem as "How can we interpret transitive Ss with Frege's degree of logical adequacy using the structures natural language provides?". Frege was free to make up structures to say what he wanted. We linguists lack that freedom.
2. A second merit of Rich DP is that it prompts us to look for (and find) new logical types of DPs. Move DP can only model object DPs that could be interpreted as subjects since they just map P1s to P0s. Now Keenan and Stavi (1986) showed that over a finite E all maps from P1 to P0 are denotable − for any such function F we can construct a (possibly quite tedious) DP which could be interpreted as F. But on Rich DP we consider functions from n+1-ary relations to n-ary ones, in particular ones from binary to unary ones. A moment's reflection shows that the maps from
] vastly outnumber those from P1 to P0 = {0,1}. Indeed for |E| = n the latter number is just 2 k , for k = 2 n . But the former number is 2 n·m , for m = 2 j , j = n 2 . So in an E with just two entities there are 2 32 or about four thousand million maps from P2 →P1. Only 16 of them are type 〈1〉 (!).
2.1 DP Anaphors Are there not other object DPs, ones that do not occur as subjects (with the same interpretation) which enable us to denote some of these other maps from P2 to P1? There are. Two such classes, discussed in Keenan (1987a) , are nominal (DP) anaphors and predicate anaphors. The former are illustrated by the italicized DPs in (7). (7) a. No poet admires himself /only himself b. John criticized every student but himself / no student but himself c. 
Theorem 2 (Keenan 1987c (Keenan , 1992 For |E| ≥ 2, there is no type 〈1〉 function F such that F(H) = SELF(H) all H ∈ P2. Ditto for ONLY SELF, NO E BUT SELF, SELF's CUBS,... Theorem 2 says that the way SELF, etc. map P2s to properties is new − no type 〈1〉 function takes just those values at all P2s. It is instructive to see why this is so. Imagine a situation in which we are talking only about people and (9a) is true. Then (9b) must hold, and its truth does not change upon replacing most poets by any type 〈1〉 DP: (9) a. John admires exactly the people who Bill trusts
John admires most poets if and only if Bill trusts most poets (MOST(POET))(λx(ADMIRE(x)(john))) = (MOST(POET))(λx(TRUST(x)(bill)))
But (9b) More formally, a type 〈1〉 h applied to P2s F and G satisfies the invariance condition in (10a). "Anaphoric" functions like SELF, etc. do not, but they satisfy the weaker condition (10b).
As a particular case, (10b) says that (11) is a valid argument.
(11) John admires exactly the people he (John) trusts. Ergo, John admires everyone but himself iff John trusts everyone but himself Let us refer to DPs which denote functions from Pn+2 to Pn+1 satisfying (10b) and failing (10a) for some choice of E, F and G, anaphoric DPs (DPAs). The italicized DPs in (7) are DPAs. DPs such as Rosa and most students at UCLA are non-anaphoric and will be called referentially autonomous, as their interpretation doesn't depend on anything outside them. DPAs greatly expand the number of denotable functions from P2 to P1, but still come nowhere close to the total (Keenan 1987a) . The set of DPAs is isomorphic to [E → Den E DP] and so can be easily counted. (On this isomorphism SELF is mapped to the identity function). A third advantage of interpreting DPAs directly is more "traditional": it provides a partial explanation for the ungrammaticality of the Ss in (12).
chosen anaphors built in syntactically different ways. See Szabolcsi (1987) and Jacobson (1999) for extensive discussion.
(12) *(Only) Himself / *Everyone but himself / *Both himself and the teacher fell asleep
If the subjects in (12) are interpreted as DPAs then the Ss should be ungrammatical since they are uninterpretable − DPAs require P2 arguments and the S provides none. Similarly for (13) providing that the transitive verb + object must form a P1.
(13) *Himself/*Everyone but himself/*Both himself and the teacher [ P1 praised every student] (Cf Every student praised himself/everyone but himself/both himself and the teacher)
Since the Ss in (13) fail Principle A (Anaphors are locally bound) given the language specific stipulation that himself, etc. is an anaphor, Binding Theory (BT) makes a stronger predication: (13) is ungrammatical. Our conditional prediction is weaker. It only says that IF himself, etc. are interpreted as DPAs in (12) then the Ss are ungrammatical. Another option is that speakers change their interpretation of these expressions once they are in subject position. In simple cases in standard English this does not happen. But there are varieties of English where it does, such as Irish English (Keenan 1988 ; Jim McCloskey pc) and various speech communities in the American North East. Crucially himself in (14a) and the first occurrence of herself in (14b) are not interpreted as SELF but rather deictically, as the prominent male/female in context. The Japanese "reflexive" zibun is also used deictically (Keenan 1988 The object of read in (16a) denotes a type 〈1〉 function, illustrated on P1s in (17).
(17) (MORE POET THAN SUE KNOW)(CAME TO THE PARTY) = 1 iff |POET ∩ {b|KNOW(b)(sue)}|>|POET ∩ {b|(CAME TO THE PARTY)(b)}|
As a type 〈1〉 function its values at P2s are as in (18):
(16b) is interpreted similarly to (16a), but in (16c) the second P2 knows is missing. A correct interpretation treats more poets than Sue as a P2 anaphor, mapping P2s to P1s as in (19):
We note without proof the analogue of Theorem 2: No type 〈1〉 function takes just the values at P2s that MORE POET THAN SUE does. PAs require a Pn argument, n ≥ 2, so we have a partial semantic explanation for the ungrammaticality of (20b) (but none for why the missing P2 cannot be filled in deictically). (23) is true iff the set of manuscripts is a subset of the set of b's that (x.at least one editor read x) maps to 1. To establish the truth of (23) we see that for each manuscript b we must choose an editor that read it − nothing prevents us from choosing different editors for different manuscripts. So let us use lambda abstraction in forming possible semantic representations, sr's, for English expressions. To be explicit: define the set SR of sr's for English to be the set of English expressions closed under lambda abstraction and concatenation of lambda expressions of type (α,β) with expressions of type α yielding ones of type β. We assume variables of all types. 6 The elements of SR are compositionally 5 H&K do not offer explicit arguments against interpreting anaphors directly as in (8). They do mention that possibility in an exercise. Their ACD argument is notation dependent, hence weak. That argument is that Ss like (i.c) should be derived by "VP deletion", a notational choice lacking (i) a. Mary read every book that Sue wrote b.
Mary read every book that Sue read c.
Mary read every book that Sue did natural motivation. The "deleted" VP read t must first be added in (!) after did. Then every book that Sue did [read t] moves to clause initial position, leaving the VP following Mary as read t. Now fiddle the numerical indices (omitted here) on the traces and the created VP can be made identical to the one following Mary and deleted. This derivation is simply painful to behold. Interpreting (i.a,b) is unproblematic, each presents two type 〈1〉 DPs, the second with a relative clause. What is semantically missing (or "pro-verbed" by did) in (i.c) is the P2 read. Interpreting the gap (or did) as the preceding P2 as with Predicate Anaphors yields a correct interpretation without applying Move DP, as in Lappin (1992) , cited in Hornstein (1995) . For a computational analysis that does not involve Move DP see Fox & Lappin (2004) . 6 LFs for English will be drawn from SR, and LFs for other languages will be drawn from their interpreted with all DPs interpreted in situ. We use (24a,b) to represent the two scope readings of (22a).
(24) a. (ONS) At least one editor read every manuscript b. (OWS) (every manuscript)(x.at least one editor read x)
The sr in (24a) is string identical to the English expression (22a). But as an sr it is interpreted with every manuscript in situ and thus with narrow scope. In (24b) every manuscript of type ((e,t),t) concatenates with (x.at least one editor read x) of type (e,t) and thus has at least one editor in its scope. No movement, only concatenation, is used in deriving (24b). SR properly includes LF. It has lambda terms that abstract over variables deep in islands and hence represent the meaning of no English expression. It also allows vacuous binding − (x.φ) for φ with no occurrences of x. Our intent is simply that SR be rich enough to provide all the semantic representations we need. To represent the meanings of English expressions d we must associate with d a possibly empty set sr(d) of sr's such that (1) each meaning of d is represented by one of the sr's in sr(d), and (2) each sr in sr(d) expresses a meaning of d. Following H&K we would do this by moving every manuscript in (22a) to some pre-subject position, possibly one of many (Beghelli and Stowell 1997) thereby deriving (24b) from (22a). To derive (24a) from (22a) no movement is needed.
In response to the pre-theoretical question "What class of formal objects might we use to represent the meanings expressible in English?" the naive sensible answer is "English expressions themselves", since they are what we already use to express the meanings of English expressions. But a scientific shortcoming of this answer is that many English expressions are used to express more than one meaning, and in the interests of precision and clarity we want to represent each meaning unambiguously. One option is to simply augment the class of English expressions with some additional structure (such as lambda abstraction) and then associate each English expression d with a set sr(d) as above. We take this route to keep our sr's as close as possible in form to the LFs adduced in H&K. But there are at least two other options: (1) as in Montague (1969) enrich the syntax of English so that different scope readings of Ss like (22a) are derived differently and then compositionally interpret the derivations. And (2) just give unambiguous paraphrases in ordinary English for each scope ambiguity, as we did in (22b) and (22c). So each sr(d) would just be a set of ordinary English expressions. But can we always make each element of each sr(d) unambiguous? Can we always disambiguate English in English? It would be unwise to assume that we can. Now we can reconstruct the claim that the LFs associated with a given expression d are derivable from d by applying rules of the sort independently motivated in the overt syntax. But we can also do more. We can say that an expression such as (25a) SRs. So LFs for different languages will be different -not only will they contain different lexical items they normally have a different syntax (as in Hornstein 1995:185) . This is unproblematic just as it is unproblematic to show in Elementary Logic that (P ∨ Q) and ¬(¬P ∧ ¬Q) are logical paraphrases (true in exactly the same models) despite being syntactically quite different. Once we know how to show that distinct syntactic structures have the same meaning the pressure to make LF the same for all languages (Hornstein 1995:7-9) diminishes to zero. fails to have an sr such as (25b) since any attempt to derive (25b) from (25a) violates a constraint on movement. (25) a. The photographer who took most of the pictures sued the magazine b. *(Most of the pictures)(x.the photographer who took x sued the magazine)
The sr (25b) is compositionally interpretable and would be true if many pictures were taken, each by a different photographer and most of the photographers sued the magazine. But (25a) is not true in such a case. Now we want to be able to exhibit the sr that (25a) would have if the movement constraint was not in force. We want this precisely to show that movement constraints are not semantically motivated, but are purely syntactic in nature. 7 But H&K cannot do this, as the relevant sr, (25b) is not an LF as all ways of deriving it violate a movement constraint. We now present our general proposal concerning scope assignment:
The Principle of Natural Scope (PNS)
Referentially autonomous DPs can always be interpreted in situ. Some may also receive a wide scope interpretation, conditions permitting.
Type 〈1〉 DPs interpreted in situ have narrow scope relative to type 〈1〉 DPs which c-command them.
8 So in transitive Ss the PNS implies that ONS (Object Narrow Scope) readings are always available; OWS ones may fail to be, and when available are often dispreferred to the ONS one. Further, many conditions disfavor or block OWS readings entirely (e.g. nominal and predicate anaphors). Few block an ONS reading.
9 Elevating this observation to the status of a "Principle" is possibly original here, but the claim itself is not. For example "The scope interpretation that matches surface hierarchy often outshines the one that does not" (Szabolcsi 1997b:110) Strict DPAs, PAs, and the object DPs in (21) are not referentially autonomous so the PNS does not apply to them. We are only concerned with DPs that can take P1s as arguments and thus which can have wide scope. The "conditions permitting" clause is a hedge. The empirical significance of the PNS depends on both the extent to which in situ interpretations predominate over wide scope ones and the extent to which we can state explicitly the conditions which permit or block wide scope interpretations.
The PNS is a naturaleness constraint: it says that natural language does not mislead us by putting quantified DPs in positions where we cannot interpret them. Rather the natural interpretation of DPs is precisely one in which they are interpreted right where we say them. Other interpretations require more complicated, less 7 Thanks to Sarah van Wagenen for discussion of this point. 8 This assumes a compositional semantic interpretation and it assumes that the c-command relations reflect the order of composition. For example it assumes we do not derive at least one editor read every manuscript by first deriving at least one editor read it and then substituting every manuscript for it.
9 Beghelli & Stowell (1997) claim that negative Ss such as Every student didn't read two poems just have the ONS reading, though OWS is available on the unnegated S. But my judgment is that this S can function as a direct denial of the ONS reading of Every student read two poems and thus does have an ONS reading. natural, semantic representations. To adapt an adage "Language is subtle but she is not mean".
Below we provide some support for the PNS. A thorough study would have to treat the thousands of pairs of DPs built from the Dets presented in Keenan & Moss 1985 or Keenan & Stavi 1986 . In addition boolean compounds of DPs would have to be treated, as well as transitive verbs of different sorts. We can not undertake such a study here, but we will note some common scope patterns which enable us to evaluate the PNS to some extent.
The choice of Dets is perhaps the single most crucial factor in determining the possibility of scope ambiguity in transitive clauses. For example, given that both ONS and OWS are available in (26a), we see that they are also available in (26b) and (26c), since the Dets are unchanged. But in (26) when no replaces at least one we lose the OWS reading. (26) a. At least one editor read every manuscript ONS OWS b.
At least one student read every assignment ONS OWS c.
At least one judge read every brief ONS OWS (27) a.
No editor read every manuscript ONS *OWS b.
No student read every assignment, etc.
ONS *OWS
The OWS analysis of (27a) is expressed by Every manuscript has the property that no editor read it. But speakers do not assert (27a) intending that meaning. Thus we cannot claim that every Y in object position may always take wide scope over Det X in subject position. It does for Det = at least one but fails for Det = no. Thus (Ben-Shalom 1993) relative scope is a relation between expressions, here the subject and object DPs, not just a property of one or the other. The pattern in (27) generalizes (Liu 1990) Contrast these cases with a pretheoretically clear case of vagueness or nonspecificity. You tell me that a student called while I was out and I respond Do you mean an Albanian student? Your reaction should be one of puzzlement since nothing you said reveals an intention to communicate the nationality of the student. Even if you wanted to say that an Albanian student called, you did not in fact say that so the good faith addressee cannot be expected to infer it. Thus, though the states of affairs in which an Albanian student called and a non-Albanian one called are different, the sentence is not ambiguous according to the nationality of the student(s). Now suppose I assert (39) and you query Was it was the same poem? I can in this case respond with Hmmm. I'm not sure. I just know that each student recited a poem in front of the class. So we can assert (39) without intending the OWS reading. Further, it would I think be unreasonable to respond to your query with Of course, that's what I just said!, piqued that you didn't understand that I meant the OWS reading. Even if I did I didn't give you enough lexical or syntactic information to infer that. I should have said something like a certain poem, or at least one or some (not sm) poem. So let us consider (41): (41) a. Every pupil recited a certain poem b. Every pupil recited some poem c. Every pupil recited one / two / five poems a certain poem in (41a) can naturally scope over every pupil, though it admits a functional, narrow scope interpretation as well (It can be true if every pupil recited his favorite poem, regardless of whether they differ or not). Now a certain is a "marked" form, contrasting with the simple indefinite article a. certain here is not an independently contentful adjective applying to poem, such as short or alliterative, so we expect that a certain will have a logical meaning which incorporates the meaning of a but which differs from it (by the Anti-Synonymy Principle "Different words have different meanings"). Assigning it wide scope accomplishes all these requirements. So this is a case of a marked expression having a marked meaning. In (41b) some poem more strongly invites a wide scope interpretation. I believe this is in part because of the blocking effect of a. Had Speaker had intended ONS s/he would have used a or reduced sm. Again choosing the more marked form is associated with a more marked meaning. In (41c) I find it unproblematic to get the ONS reading, as do Beghelli & Stowell (1997:80) who find both OWS and ONS readings natural. A near paraphrase of (41c), on at least one reading, is The number of poems that every pupil recited was one / two / five. Still (41c) does admit an OWS interpretation easily. Additional support that it is not the only reading comes from anaphora. May (1985) observed that an object anaphorically bound to a subject cannot outscope the subject. There is no ambiguity in At least one student criticized everyone but himself. And if five poems in (41c) could only have wide scope it would be surprising that we could modify it as in (42). (42) Every pupil i read five poems of his i choice
In sum the PNS receives significant empirical support and it provides an explanation for why objects typically scope under subjects.
Conclusion
We have presented a formally explicit mode of direct, in situ interpretation of quantificational DPs that does not involve type mismatches or multiple type assignments. Moreover it coincides with the interpretations H&K assign to DPs when they occur as subjects. Advantages of this way of interpreting DPs are that it accounts for why quantificational DPs occur in object position (like Names) and why narrow scope readings are favored over wide scope ones. It has also enabled us to find a variety of object DPs that can not be interpreted as functions from properties to truth values and hence to which Move DP a la H&K cannot apply.
